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A Person with No Standing Cannot Contest a Will

I wrote yesterday about the role of standing in Mississippi will contests. Simply stated, a person cannot bring a valid will contest unless they have a valid interest in the outcome of the matter to bring before the court.

The recent probate case of Tatum vs. Wells[1] illustrates the role that standing can play in a Mississippi will contest. In December 1966, Eldridge Tatum died leaving six children. He had a will that left all of his property and possessions to one son, Robert Tatum. Robert admitted the will to the probate court in October of 1967 and was appointed as executor of Eldrige’s estate. But Robert died unexpectedly in 1969, before his father’s estate was closed.

Eldridge’s estate remained in limbo. As time progressed, Robert’s property was dispersed amongst his wife and seven children, who maintained and paid taxes on the land that Eldridge had left to Robert. In 2004, Robert’s children attempted to divide the property amongst themselves. However, the title company refused to complete the transfer of title until Eldridge Tatum’s estate was closed. (Note: This is an example of how a probate issue can lie dormant for years, only to pop up when someone needs to deal with the property–see our section on Probate and Real Estate for more information.)

Robert’s daughter Helen Wells went before the probate court and asked to be appointed executrix over her grandfather’s estate so that she could close it. Her cousins responded to her request to be named executrix by contesting the will. The cousins were upset that all of Eldridge’s property had been left to Robert, to the exclusion of their parents. By the time of the will contest, all of Eldridge Tatum’s children had passed away.

The lower court dismissed the case, finding that the grandchildren who were contesting Eldridge’s will lacked standing to do so. The contesting parties appealed, placing the issue before the Mississippi Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals noted that Eldridge’s children would have been interested parties to their father’s will at the time it was admitted to probate. They were his heirs at law who would have taken property from their father through intestate succession. In other words, because they would have benefited from the invalidity of Eldridge’s will, they had a legitimate interest in the probate proceeding and thus had standing to contest his will, as long as they did so within the two-year statute of limitations.

But Eldridge’s children didn’t contest the will. Could their children (i.e., Eldridge’s grandchildren) now do so? The answer depended on whether, at the time the will was entered into probate, they had a direct pecuniary interest in the estate that would have been detrimentally affected if the will had been determined to be invalid.

Mississippi does allow a right of representation, which allows descendants of deceased heirs to take the share that their parent would have taken if alive. But the right of representation only applies if the heir is deceased. In this case, the grandchildren who contested the will would not have had a right of representation at the time of the will contest since their parents were still alive at that time. Even if the will had been found invalid and their parents had inherited a share of Eldridge’s estate, there is no guarantee any of Eldridge’s estate would have passed to the grandchildren (for example, it could have been spent by their parents before it got to the next generation). Therefore, the grandchildren had no claim to the estate now that their parents have all passed away.

The Court of Appeals held that the grandchildren were not interested parties at the time the will was entered into probate. They lacked a pecuniary interest at the time their grandfather died and throughout the two-year period open to contest. They did not have the ability to inherit through intestate succession at that time, and they had no assurance that they would have received the property even if their parents had inherited it. Thus, the grandchildren did not have standing to contest the will.

Tatum v. Wells, 2007-CP-02081-COA

[1] Tatum v. Wells, 2007-CP-02081-COA.

Standing in Mississippi Will Contests

A basic principle of the American legal system is that a person who brings a lawsuit must have a legitimate reason to do so. This principle is embodied in the doctrine of standing, which refers to the ability of a party to demonstrate that it has a legitimate interest in the outcome of a case so as to justify that party’s participation on the case. In the words of the United States Supreme Court, “the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.”[1] A person without standing cannot bring a lawsuit.

The law of standing applies to will contests as well. In order to contest a will and the bequests made within the document, one must first have standing to come before the court. A person has standing to contest a will when they are deemed to be an interested party.

In Mississippi, any interested party may contest the validity of a will as long as the contest comes within the two years that follow the will’s admittance to probate in common form. If the interested party fails to bring contest within the two-year period, the probate is final and binding. There is an exception to the finality of the probate is made for minors and people of unsound mind who may wish to contest the will. They will receive an additional two years to contest validity once their respective disabilities have been removed.[2]

Interested parties are defined as “parties who have a pecuniary interest in the subject of the contest, and under all of the authorities the heirs at law who would take the property of the deceased in the absence of a valid will.”[3]

[1] Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).

[2] See Miss. Code Ann. § 91-7-23.

[3] Hoskins v. Holmes County Cmty. Hosp., 135 Miss. 89, 101, 99 So. 570, 573 (1924).

Inheritance Rights of Adopted Children in Mississippi

A recent Mississippi Supreme Court involved two adopted children were set to inherit from their non-biological grandmother’s will. Another beneficiary sought to have their adoption set aside so they could not benefit from the grandmother’s estate. The court held that only the biological parents of the adopted children had the right to object to the adoption.

William Gartrell, III and Diane Weiss were married, each having two children from a previous marriage. In 1984, William adopted Diane’s two daughters, Jodey and Lisa. The girls were 18 and 15 at the time of the adoption. Their natural father, George Weiss, did not contest the adoption.

In 2002, William passed away leaving his two biological children Will and Cindy, as well as his adopted children Jodey and Lisa, as his heirs. In 2003, William’s mother Dorothy Gartrell passed away. She died leaving a will that left everything she had to her children William and Kay. The terms of the will specified that each child get half of her estate. And since William predeceased his mother his half would be inherited by his children, per stirpes. (Per stirpes is a legal term referring to how assets will be distributed in the event that a beneficiary predeceases the person who made the will. It also identifies the class who is eligible to inherit in place of the dead beneficiary. In this case, William’s “heirs at law” were specified to receive his share.)

When Dorothy passed away, her daughter Kay, the executrix of the will, petitioned the court to determine William’s “heirs at law.” The court found that William’s legal heirs were his two biological children, Will and Cindy, and his two adopted children, Jodey and Lisa. The court based their findings on Mississippi Code Section 93-17-13 (Rev. 2004), stated that by adopting Jodey and Lisa they were entitled to inherit in the same way as “brothers and sisters of the full blood by the laws of descent and distribution of the State of Mississippi.”

Kay did not agree with the findings of the court and brought a petition to contest the 1984 adoption of Jodey and Lisa. She argued that the court that granted the adoption did not have proper jurisdiction over the adoption or the biological father. The lower court found that the adoption lacked jurisdiction and invalidated it.

Jodey, Lisa, and their other Diane appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Mississippi arguing that Kay lacked standing to object to the adoption. Standing requires that the party have a personal stake in the issue in question. While it could be argued that Kay has a personal stake in the adoption, as it relates to the will, she does not have a stake in the adoption itself.

In Mississippi, both natural parents must be notified of the adoption and only a natural parent has a statutory right to object to an adoption. Cases in which natural grandparents objected to an adoption have held that even grandparents lack standing to object.

The court noted one exception in which an heir of an estate was allowed to attack an adoption of an adult male, In re Estate of Reid. This case is distinguished from Gartrell in part because the adoption in Reid had been obtained by fraud. The legal tool of adoption was abused as a way to secure an inheritance through fraud and undue influence. Once the adoption was issued, the adopted adult became the sole beneficiary of the estate. Evidence of fraud and undue influence will be allowed by the court to show lack of intent on the part of the creator of the will.

There was no issue of fraud or undue influence in this case. The adoption was based on blending a family and was not used as a device to ensure inheritance. Therefore, the court found no similarity between the current case and that of Reid. The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that only a natural parent may contest the adoption of a child and that Kay Gartrell lacked proper standing to contest the adoption of Jodey and Lisa.

Gartrell v. Gartrell, 2008-IA-00676-SCT (Dec. 17, 2009)

In re Estate of Reid, 825 So. 2d 1 (Miss. 2002)

Proving Testamentary Capacity and Undue Influence

Undue influence claims are really about testamentary capacity. For a will to be valid, the testator (the person making the will) must have testamentary capacity. Testamentary capacity exists when a person is fully aware of his actions and understands that he is giving away his assets. The person must also understand who his assets are being given to.

The person alleging that the will is the product of undue influence is really arguing that the influence was such that the person who made the will lacked the mental capacity to do so. The person is claiming that the person’s mind was so overridden by the influence of another that the person didn’t have the mental capacity to execute a will.

Because these issues are so fact-specific, cases involving testamentary capacity often involve burdens of proof. The burden of proof has to do with whose responsibility it is to prove a given fact. The party submitting the will for probate has the burden of proving that the will is valid. Once the court establishes that the will, on its face, is valid, the party contesting the will must then offer proof to why the will is in invalid.

Evidence of testamentary capacity is judged by a standard known as the preponderance of the evidence. Preponderance of the evidence is a standard in which the court weighs the evidence presented by each party and decides upon the most convincing. Each side’s evidence is weighed according to relevance and reliability and not merely by the amount that is presented.

A recent Mississippi appellate case illustrates the application of this standard to will contests based on lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence. The case involved a Mississippi appellate court’s decision about the validity of a will made by Willie Ray Rutland in 2002. Willie Ray died in 2005 and was survived by his niece, Diane Rutland Nations, his cousin, Calvin Rutland, and his nephews, Rickie Dale Rutland and Todd Rutland.

Willie Ray’s 2002 will, which named Diane Rutland Nations as the sole beneficiary of his estate, was offered to probate by Calvin Rutland. The will was contested by Rickie and Todd Rutland on the grounds that Willie Ray lacked the mental capacity to execute a will in 2002 and also that the will was executed under undue influence from Calvin and Diane. Rickie and Todd wanted the court to accept a will written by Willie Ray in 1989 in which he left all his real property to Rickie and Todd.

The lower court’s decision was a disappointment all the way around. The lower court found that the 2002 will was invalid based on Willie Ray’s lack of mental capacity (testamentary capacity) to execute a will, but did not discuss the issue of undue influence. But the lower court didn’t like the 1989 will either, holding that Willie Ray’s estate should be administered as though he died without a will (intestate).

The parties appealed the decision of the lower court. The appellate court had to decide if Willie Ray had sufficient testamentary capacity to execute a will in 2002 will or, conversely, if the 2002 will had been the product of undue influence.

The court heard testimony from all the parties. The testimony indicated that Willie Ray signed the will at his residence in a retirement home. It was drawn up by an attorney, who was a friend of Calvin’s, and Willie Ray signed the will in front of witnesses, including Calvin and the administrator of the retirement home. The attorney, the administrator, and Willie Ray’s doctor testified that he was fully aware of his actions and what he was doing with his assets.

Rickie and Todd testified that Willie Ray had been losing his mind since 1998 and could not have understood the gravity of his actions. But neither Rickie nor Todd had seen Willie Ray around the time the 2002 will was signed and often went months without seeing him. The court discounted their testimony, stating “testimony regarding capacity from witnesses who have not seen the testator in months will be deemed irrelevant by the Court.” The court held that testimony that is broad or overly general will not meet the preponderance of the evidence standard when it is contradicted by specific, relevant evidence of mental capacity. The court noted that a person that generally lacks the mental capacity to execute a will can make a valid will during “lucid intervals” when capacity exists. Therefore, the court found that Willie Ray possessed sufficient testamentary capacity to execute the 2002 will.

Rickie and Todd also asserted that Willie Ray’s 2002 will was the product of undue influence by Calvin and Diane. When writing a will it is also important that you are executing the will on your own volition and not solely for the benefit of another. The court will throw out a will that has been executed under undue influence (for more on undue influence, see What is Undue Influence?). The court presumes undue influence if a confidential relationship existed between the testator and a beneficiary of the will and there is evidence that the beneficiary somehow abused their relationship. One example of suspected undue influence is if a beneficiary is an active participant in the execution of the will. However, to be considered undue influence, the will must reflect the desire of the beneficiary rather than the intentions of the testator.

The court found enough evidence to prove a confidential relationship between Diane and Willie Ray. During the period of time that Willie Ray created his 2002 will Diane assisted Willie Ray in getting around town, she held power of attorney to execute financial and legal documents on his behalf, and she had helped him with his finances since 2001. But one must prove more than just the existence of a confidential relationship. To have the will invalidated for undue influence Diane, as the sole beneficiary, must have actively participated in the execution of the will. Evidence was presented that Diane was not in the room at the time the will was executed, nor had she had any significant contact with Willie Ray’s attorney or Willie Ray regarding the drafting of the will. Based on these facts, the court held that the will was not a product of undue influence and was valid. The 2002 will was found to replace the will executed by Willie Ray in 1989 and Rickie and Todd failed to inherit from Willie Ray.

In re Estate of Rutland, 2008-CA-01671-COA (Dec. 8, 2009).

No Automatic Presumption of Undue Influence Between Spouses

Does the automatic presumption of undue influence apply to transfers between spouses? According to the Mississippi Court of Appeals decision in In the Matter of the Estate of Patricia McDaniel Langston, the answer is no.

Patricia and Mansfield Langston were married for 11 years. During this time, Patricia transferred the marital home to Mansfield after she purchased a new home. She later executed a will leaving her entire estate to her three adult children from a previous marriage and to one of her sisters. She named her husband as executor of her estate. Her will stated that her husband was left out of the will because he had his own estate.

A few months after signing the will, the Langston’s attorney prepared three deeds. One transferred Patricia’s new home (which had become the marital home) from her name only to both her and Mansfield’s names as joint tenants with right of survivorship. Another deed transferred the original home from Mansfield to Patricia’s mother. The third deed transferred property to a third party in a sale.

A month after transferring the property, Patricia executed another will which changed the executor of her will from her husband to her mother. A few months later, Patricia and Mansfield purchased a CD in the amount of $200,000 in both their names as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. Just under two years later, Patricia died.

Upon her death, Patricia’s mother opened her estate and attempted to set aside the joint tenancies that had been established in the marital home and the CD and bring them into probate for distribution under the terms of Patricia’s will. The estate claimed that these joint tenancies were the result of undue influence exercised by Mansfield during a time that Patricia suffered from chronic illness.

The lower court relied on the confidential relationship between Mansfield and Patricia to apply the presumption of undue influence. On appeal, the appellate court noted that most marriages inherently involve a close confidential relationship, and therefore, the presumption of undue influence may not always apply.

In the typical undue influence case, the giver and the recipient are in a relationship that gives the recipient the opportunity to wrongfully cause the giver to turn over his or her property. This is known as a confidential relationship. (For more on undue influence, see What is Undue Influence?). But in this case, Patricia and Mansfield had been married 11 years. The very nature of a long-term marriage implies a confidential relationship. This made it easy for the estate to meet the factor test for confidential relationships.

In recognition of this situation, the Court of Appeals declined to apply the automatic presumption of undue influence in the marital context. Instead, the Court held that undue influence must be established by showing that the grantee spouse used “undue methods for the purpose of overcoming the free will” of the grantor spouse such that the grantee controlled her acts and prevented her from acting of her own mind.

In the Langston case, there was overwhelming evidence that Patricia was a very strong-willed person and that she continued to be so during all of the transfers in question. She may have been physically ill, but she attended all meetings and did the majority of talking. It was clear that the transfers were made of her own free will and not as the result of Mansfield exercising his dominance over her. As such, the lower court’s finding of undue influence was reversed.

In the Matter of the Estate of Patricia McDaniel Langston, 2008-CA-01090-COA (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).